THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SPEAKING[1]

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Culture is transmitted largely through the medium of language, and behavior is in large measure both learned and expressed through language. Although linguistics has perhaps the most highly developed and sophisticated methodology of all the fields which deal with human behavior, until very recently linguists paid little attention to the "non-linguistic" aspects of language. This paper is by a person who is simultaneously both linguist and ethnologist by training, experience, and interests (and, significantly, poet by avocation). It indicates several areas of research which involve the linguist's knowledge of the structure of language itself, and the ethnologist's and psychologist's interest in the functions of speech. The importance of Dr. Hymes' suggestions is emphasized by the sparseness of materials on these topics which emerge from a review of the literature of the several disciplines involved. Essentially, this is a call for research on very important topics about which we know practically nothing, and an indication of several research designs likely to prove productive in the study of language as a cultural phenomenon.

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INTRODUCTION

The role of speech in human behavior has always been honored in anthropological principle, if sometimes slighted in practice. The importance

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[1] I should like to dedicate this paper to Roman Jakobson. He has generously given his time to discuss it with me, and his criticisms have led to many improvements. If at some points I have had to follow my own nose, just because of that I want to state clearly my debt to the stimulation of his ideas, and my belief that his work is a model to anthropology of a broad integrating approach to language.

of its study has been declaimed (as by Malinowski [1935]), surveyed with insightful detail (as in Sapir [1933]), and accepted as a principle of field work (see citations in Hymes 1959).

That the study of speech might be crucial to a science of man has been a recurrent anthropological theme. Boas (1911) came to see language as one in kind with ethnological phenomena generally (he interpreted eth-nology as the science of mental phenomena), but revealing more of basic processes because more out of awareness, less subject to overlay by rationali-zation. Some anthropologists have seen language, and hence linguistics, as basic to a science of man because it provides a link between the biological and sociocultural levels. Some have seen in modern linguistic methodology a model or harbinger of a general methodology for studying the structure of human behavior.

American anthropology has played an important part in the progress of linguistics in this country, through the careers of Boas, Sapir, Bloomfield, and their students, and through the opportunities offered by American Indian languages. It has contributed to the development of particular tech-niques and concepts, and has used linguistics as a tool for other lines of research. In both respects, anthropology's involvement with linguistics has come to be shared now by psychology. Having assimilated modern advances in linguistics, many psychologists have contributed studies of considerable relevance and value in recent years. One need cite only the work of Charles Osgood, George Miller, and Roger Brown. Hybridization between lin-guistic concepts, and the technologies of the computers and experimental psychology, is producing perhaps the most rapidly growing sector in the study of speech, one with which anthropology must keep informed liaison.

Indeed, diffusion of the tools of modern linguistics may be a hall mark of the second half of this century. In the course of such diffusion, pre-sumably three things will hold true: (1) the discipline of linguistics will continue to contribute studies of the history, structure, and use of languages; (2) in other disciplines, linguistic concepts and practices will be qualified, reinterpreted, subsumed, and perhaps sometimes re-diffused in changed form into linguistics; (3) linguistics will remain the discipline responsible for coordinating knowledge about verbal behavior from the viewpoint of lan-guage itself.

In any event, the joint share of linguistics and psychology in the bur-geoning study of verbal behavior seems vigorous and assured. Has anthro-pology a share apart from some of its practitioners becoming linguists and psychologists, and apart from its traditional role as an intellectual holding

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company under the ægis of culture? Is the role of prime collaborator of linguistics among the sciences now to pass to psychology? Sheer weight of numbers may determine. It would be of no importance were it not for the value to linguistics and anthropology of a strengthening, not a relaxing, of mutual concern.

In one regard, there is no danger of lapse. Modern linguistics is diffusing widely in anthropology itself among younger scholars, producing work of competence that ranges from historical and descriptive studies to problems of semantics and social variation. Most such work is on well-defined linguistic problems; its theoretical basis is established, its methodology well grounded, and its results important, epecially for areas in which languages rapidly dwindle in number. There is no need to detail the contribution which such work makes to anthropological studies, nor to argue its permanent value to linguistics proper. If anything, the traditional bonds between linguistics and anthropology in the United States are more firmly rooted now than a decade ago.

What may lapse is an opportunity to develop *new* bonds, through contributions to the study of verbal behavior that collaboration between anthropology and linguistics can perhaps alone provide. This is more than a matter of putting linguistics to work in the study of other scientific problems, such as cognitive behavior or expressive behavior. The role of speech in both is important, and has engaged anthropological attention: the cognitive problem in association with the name of Whorf, the expressive problem more recently under the heading of "paralinguistics." But to pursue these problems, and to try to give them firm anthropological footing, is to broach the study of a new problem area, one of which little account is taken.

There are indeed several underdeveloped intellectual areas involving speech to which anthropology can contribute. All are alike in that they need fresh theoretical thought, methodological invention, and empirical work, and have roots in anthropology's vocation as a comparative discipline. Among these areas are the revitalization of dialectology (perhaps under the heading of "sociolinguistics"); the place of language in an evolutionary theory of culture; the semantic typology of languages; and the truly comparative study of verbal art.[2] Fortunately, all those mentioned have begun to attract attention. For the anthropological study of behavior there is

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[2] Towards the first of these, see Gumperz (1961); towards the other three, see respectively, Hymes (1961c, 1961a, and 1960a [for the typology at the close of the latter]). Such developments will require rapprochement with established philological disciplines, which control much of the essential data.

another area of importance, one that seems general, central, and neglected. It can be called the *ethnography of speaking.*

In one sense this area fills the gap between what is usually described in grammars, and what is usually described in ethnographies. Both use speech as evidence of other patterns; neither brings it into focus in terms of its own patterns. In another sense, this is a question of what a child internalizes about speaking, beyond rules of grammar and a dictionary, while becoming a full-fledged member of its speech community. Or, it is a question of what a foreigner must learn about a group's verbal behavior in order to participate appropriately and effectively in its activities. The ethnography of speaking is concerned with the situations and uses, the patterns and functions, of speaking as an activity in its own right.

What the content of this area may be in detail, what a description of it as a system might be like—these things are hard to state, although I shall attempt it in this paper. Field studies devoted to the topic hardly exist, nor has there been much attention to what the theory and method of such studies would be. Occasional information can be gleaned, enough to show that the patterns and functions of speaking can be very different from one group to another—how speech enters into socialization and education, for example, may differ strikingly. But the evidence is not enough to itemize all variables, or show a system. Hence the orientation of what follows must be toward the field work that is necessary.

Why undertake such field work? The reasons are several: because the phenomena are there, ready to be brought into order; so that systematic descriptions can give rise to a comparative study of the cross-cultural variation in a major mode of human behavior (a "comparative speaking" beside comparative religion, comparative law, and the like), and give it its place in theory; for the contribution to other kinds of concern, such as studies of the formation of personality in early years.

I shall attempt to bring out the nature and problems of this area by indicating first that study of speech as a factor in cognitive and expressive behavior leads to concern with the ethnographic patterning of the uses of speech in a community. Then I shall sketch a descriptive framework for getting at such patterning. A "notes-and-queries" survey of the role of speech in socialization will bring together much of the content and method in the frame of one problem. Finally, I shall sketch the changes in theoretical perspective that underlie the whole.

SPEECH IN COGNITIVE AND EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

The role of speech in cognitive behavior is an old concern of anthro-

pology. In recent years discussion has most often had reference to Whorf's views. There is not space here to evaluate the ideas and studies that are pertinent, and I can only refer to two other papers (Hymes 1961a, b). It can be briefly said that there is no question but that speech habits are among the determinants of non-linguistic behavior, and conversely. The question is that of the modes and amounts of reciprocal influence.

If our concern is the role of phonological habits in the perception and interpretation of sounds, there exists an abundance of theory, technique, and experimental work. If our concern is the role of semantic habits in perception and interpretation of experience, there is no such abundance. Some experimental testing has been done (see comment in Hymes 1961b), but we cannot adequately investigate the role of semantic habits in ordinary behavior without knowledge of the semantic habits that are available to play a role, and such knowledge can be gained only by description in relation to native contexts of use. In other words, we need a semantic analysis that is a part of ethnography.

The need for such an ethnographic semantics has been pointed out before, and it is the theme of Malinowski's *Coral Gardens and Their Magic,* Part II. How to implement an ethnographic semantics, however, how to devise its methodology, largely remains. Malinowski saw clearly the need to analyze meaning in contexts of use, but his method amounted in practice to massive narrative. An ethnographic semantics may be bulky, but it need not be on principle interminable, nor endlessly ad hoc. It should be more than a narrative reflection of reality. It should be a structural analysis, achieving the economies of the rules of a grammar in relation to a series of analyses of texts.

In the past generation Jakobson and his associates have done most to develop such a structural semantics. In recent years a fresh wave of American interest has appeared in significant papers by linguists such as Haugen (1957) and Joos (1958), and by ethnographers such as Conklin (1955, 1962), Goodenough (1956a, 1957), and Lounsbury (1956). Here as in other studies there are two general approaches, as Jakobson has so brilliantly set forth: on the one hand to trace an item through all the various contexts in which it can occur, characterizing it in terms of its ability to co-occur with other items, and on the other to place an item within a set which can occur in particular contexts, characterizing it in terms of its substitutability for other items of that set. The two approaches have various names, such as the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes (see Jakobson and Halle 1956). The first approach is essentially that of a concordance; the second approach can be termed that of a contrast within a frame, or better, contrast within

a relevant (or valid) frame. Here I want to side with those who consider the latter the more fundamental of the two, since it validates the structural relevance of the items whose distribution is studied by the first approach, and adds information of its own; and assert that use of this fundamental "contrast within a frame" approach must lead linguistics into ethnography, and ethnography into analysis of patterns of speaking.

Here I can only outline the argument. The paradigmatic approach requires discovering a relevant frame or context, identifying the items which contrast within it, and determining the dimensions of contrast for the items within the set so defined. The approach has been successful for phonology and grammar, but only partly so for lexicon. Indeed, it is much disputed that a structural approach can be applied to the whole of a language, when the whole of vocabulary is considered. Yet it would be remarkable, and should be a source of embarrassment, if the paradigmatic principle fundamental to the core of language should fail us here. Recognizing this, linguists associated with the glossematic school have proposed modes of analysis of "content-structure" and defended the possibility of extending them to all of lexicon on principle. These modes may prove fruitful, despite theoretical criticisms, although some seem to smack too much of the ad hoc and arbitrary at present. In any case these approaches tend to stay within received bodies of linguistic data rather than to move outward into the exploration of speech behavior and use. Such exploration is essential, whether one is concerned with semantics delimited as dealing with designation and intension, or whether one is concerned also with what one might then term "pragmatic meaning," as the ethnography of speaking must be. (Cf. Firth's inclusion in his conception of "semantics" of this pragmatic dimension of meaning, which he places beyond lexicography in the province of "sociological linguistics" [1935:27].)

The need for such exploration is easy to see. One source of the present impasse in structural analysis of content is precisely the limitations of the contexts available in the usual linguistic materials. The usual corpus provides sufficient contexts for phonological and grammatical analysis, but for semantic analysis of only a few limited sets of frequently recurring elements, such as case-endings and prepositions. That is one reason Wells writes, regarding the possibility of structural analysis of items such as the Latin stem *tabul-*, "the only reliable method now available depends upon treating it as a member of some C[ontent]-paradigm. This we do not see how to do" (Wells, 1957).

Scholars sometimes have been willing also to posit dimensions of contrast for a few other domains, apparently universal or 'given,' such as

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kinship terms, numerals, pronouns. But in fact even the seemingly most obvious domains cannot be taken for granted. It may sometimes be assumed that, although languages segment experience differently, what they segment is the same, as if it were a matter of different jigsaw puzzles fashioned from the same painting. But recent work shows that structural analysis of meaning must first demonstrate that a domain *is* a domain for speakers of the language in question. What the domain includes, what it excludes, what features define it and its elements, cannot be prescribed in advance, even for kinship (cf. Conant 1961) or color terms (Conklin 1955). (The principle is generally true for cultural phenomena; cf., on residence rules, Goodenough [1956b], and on the structure of the family, Adams [1960]).

The exploration of native contexts of use to validate domains is the basis of the success of Conklin and Frake, and it points the way for the structural analysis of all of speech. All utterances occur contrastively in contexts, but for much of lexicon and most larger units of speech, the contextual frames must be sought not in the usual linguistic corpus, but in behavioral situations. One must reciprocally establish the modes and settings of behavior relevant to speech, and the sets of verbal items that occur within them; dimensions of contrast and rules of use, whether purely semantic (designative) or concerned with other imports and functions, can then be found. (The sets would often not be perceived from a formal linguistic point of view, being formally diverse, e.g., a set of greetings may range from "Hi" to "It's a damned good thing you got here when you did, Jack").

The approach of course requires the structural analysis of the community in relation to speech that would constitute an ethnography of speaking. This approach is an answer to the problem posed by Hjelmslev (1957:283) : "Une description structurale ne pourra s'effectuer qu'à condition de pouvoir réduire les classes ouvertes à des classes fermées."

For understanding and predicting behavior, contexts have a cognitive significance that can be summarized in this way. The use of a linguistic form identifies a range of meanings. A context can support a range of meanings. When a form is used in a context, it eliminates the meanings possible to that context other than those that form can signal; the context eliminates from consideration the meanings possible to the form other than those that context can support. The effective meaning depends upon the interaction of the two. (Recently stated by Joos (1958), this principle has also been formulated by Bühler (1934:183) and Firth (1935:32).)

Important also is the point that the cognitive role of speech is not all-or-nothing, but a matter of what, where, and when. Speech is cognitively more important in some activities than others, some times more than others, for some persons more than others, for some societies more than others. The

amount and kind of influence may change as between the child and the adult, and there are the obvious problems of the relative importance of their languages for multilinguals.

Such concern with speech in contexts of behavior leads toward analysis of individual patterns in particular native situations. If from a grammar, we can not read off the role that speech habits play in present-day behavior, neither can we do so from an experimental situation novel to the culture. Nor can the assessment be made from compartmentalized accounts of speech habits and of other habits, compared point-for-point in some millenial future. The analysis must be made on the ground. We must know what patterns are available in what contexts, and how, where and when they come into play. The maxim that "meaning is use" has new force when we seriously study the role of semantic habits in behavior.

In sum, description of semantic habits depends upon contexts of use to define relevant frames, sets of items, and dimensions of contrast. Moreover, persons and groups may differ in the behavior that is mediated by speech. Thus analysis of the role of speech in cognitive behavior leads into analysis of the ethnographic context of speech.

The same holds true for the role of speech in expressive behavior. Of course there is a cognitive aspect to expressive behavior, insofar as it pre-supposes the sharing of a code, so that semantic habits do not exhaust the cognitive role of speech. Likewise, there is an expressive aspect to the cognitive style of an individual or group, and in general, all speech phenomena can be interpreted by a hearer as expressive of a speaker. But expressive studies tend to emphasize speech as an aspect of personality, and to throw into prominence features of speech, such as tone of voice and hesitation pauses, that lie outside lexicon and grammar—phenomena which have recently been systematized in a preliminary way under the heading of "paralinguistics." (For a general survey of both cognitive and expressive aspects of personality, linguistically viewed, see Hymes [1961b]). The principal study to result so far from the work in paralinguistics, that of Pittenger, Hockett and Danehy (1960) is based on the heuristic, if some-what intuitive, use of the principle of contrast within a frame, applied to the unfolding of a psychiatric interview. Indeed, the main task confronting paralinguistics is to determine the import of the phenomena it has isolated by further study of their contrastive use in situations. In general, advances in analysis of the expressive role of speech also lead into analysis of the ethnographic context.[3]

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[3] Mahl (1959) has discussed an "instrumental aspect of language" as con-stituting a gap in psychology. He argues that "the instrumental model is the more general and valid one for purposes of inferring emotional states from language

Among other anthropological concerns which lead into such analysis, there is the aspect of culture change involving programs of fundamental education, concerned with literacy and multilingualism. In introducing new uses for indigenous forms of speech, and in extending foreign forms of speech into local contexts, the patterns and functions of speaking on both sides need to be analyzed, so as to anticipate points of congruence and conflict (cf. Weinrich 1953 and Hymes 1961c).

Now it is time to consider how the analysis of the ethnographic context of speech may be carried out. There are a number of lines of research whose goals overlap those of an ethnography of speaking, and whose results and methods must contribute. Since these lines of research have so far not fused or had the particular focus and scope that is of concern here, it is worthwhile, perhaps necessary, to take this opportunity to broach the descriptive problem and to outline a method of approach. My way of getting at it is of course without prejudice to ways that prove rewarding to others. Approaches to ethnographic analysis devised under linguistic influence, although they may diverge, are likely to show strong family resemblance at many points.[4]

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SPEAKING

The descriptive focus is the speech economy of a community. The

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behavior" (p. 40) and that the instrumental model is more closely linked to behavior than the representational (cognitive, or lexicon-and-grammar focussed) model. But a cognitive approach may be concerned with the effect of a speech-derived symbolic map on problem-solving, planning, and the like, and hence can also be called "instrumental," since it also deals with speech as tool-using behavior. In exploring the signalling of emotional states, Mahl deals with what will here be termed expressive function, and in pointing to the effect of this signalling on the behavior of others, he deals with what will here be termed directive function. His use of "instrumental" subsumes the two. I particularly value Mahl's analysis because he insists on "including the situational and/or the nonlexical contexts of messages" (105) and in effect demands the equivalent of an ethnography of speaking in relation to the analysis of speech events for certain psychological purposes.

[4] E. T. Hall, *The Silent Language*, is especially worthwhile. Details apart, my only reservation is that the 10 primary message systems, the 3 levels of culture, the 3 components of messages, the 3 principal types of patterns, and the 100-category map of culture should be taken more frankly as heuristic devices. In particular the 10 primary message systems seem but one convenient breakdown, rather than rooted in biology, and the components (set, isolate, pattern) and pattern types (order, selection, congruence) seem a valid but partial extrapolation of a linguistic model. Several such extrapolations, particularly those of Hall and Trager, of Jakobson, and Pike (1954, 1955, 1960), and of Uldall, have each their contribution to perspective, but none has yet carried the day. The Hall and Trager framework of components (set, isolate, pattern) converges in a noteworthy way with the trimodal framework (manifestation, feature, distribution modes) of Pike.

scope is all behavior relevant to a structural ("emic," in Pike's terminology) analysis of this. The approach is not to consider behavioral reality a pie and the speech economy a unique slice. It is a question of an organizing perspective on a social reality that is the same for differing analytical frameworks. I believe that structural analysis in this particular framework will be of value in its own right and will feed back into analyses from other perspectives.

By structural analysis is meant more than the placing of data in an articulated set of categories. Such placing is a necessary starting point, and also a desired outcome, when systems that have been individually analyzed are studied comparatively. But for the individual system, structural analysis means a scientific and moral commitment to the inductive discovery of units, criteria, and patternings that are valid in terms of the system itself. An illustration is the interrelation between phonetics as a starting point, the phonemic analysis of a given language, and the use of the results of that analysis in general linguistics, e.g., in phonemic typology; or, ethnological categories as a starting point, the ethnographic analysis of, say, the residence rules of a community, and the use of the results of that analysis in a comparative study. The categories presented here for an ethnography of speaking must be taken as ways of getting at individual systems, as analagous to a phonetics and perhaps part of a practical phonemics. The intent is heuristic, not *a priori*.

The point seems obvious, but experience shows it to be easily mistaken. Let me put it another way. What would be an appropriate improvement, or correction, of what follows? Not an argument that there *really are* 3, or 8, or 76, factors or functions of speech—in general. That would be equivalent to arguing how many phonemes there *really are*—in general. The problem, of course, is how many phonemes, or factors and functions, there are in some one determinate system. What the range in number of factors and functions may be, what invariants of universal scope there may be—answers to these questions may perhaps be glimpsed now, but must wait for demonstration on the structural analyses of many systems. An appropriate improvement or correction, then, is one that contributes to that job, that makes of this paper a better practical phonetics and phonemics.

It can be asked: to what extent is analysis from the perspective of speaking itself valid structurally to a given case? Activity defined as speaking by one group may be defined as something else by another. But differences of this sort are themselves of interest. Some behavior will be organized and defined in terms of speaking in every group, and the import of this behavior may be missed if not investigated as such. Only a focus on speak-

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ing answers the structural question, and provides data for comparative study of the differential involvement of speaking in the structure of behavior in different groups. In one sense, a comparative ethnography of speaking is but one kind of comparative study of the utilization of cultural resources.

Note that the delimitation of the speech economy of a group is in relation to a population or community, however defined, and not in relation to the homogeneity or boundaries of a linguistic code. If several dialects or languages are in use, all are considered together as part of the speech activity of the group. This approach breaks at the outset with a one language-one culture image. Indeed, for much of the world the primary object of attention will not coincide with the units defined as individual languages. The patterning of a linguistic code will count as one among several analytical abstractions from verbal behavior. In cultural terms, it will count as one among several sets of speech habits. The specialization of particular languages or varieties to particular situations or functions, and the implications of each for personality, status, and thinking, will be a normal part of a description. Standard analysis of each code will of course be necessary, but the broader framework seems more "natural," indeed, more properly anthropological. The structure of this argument also applies if the focus of attention is not a population but an individual personality.[5]

A necessary step is to place speaking within a hierarchy of inclusiveness: not all behavior is communicative, from the viewpoint of the participants; not all communication is linguistic; and linguistic means include more than speech. One can ask of an activity or situation: is there a communicative act (to oneself or another) or not? If there is, is the means linguistic or non-linguistic (gesture, body-movement) or both? In a given case, one of the alternatives may be necessary, or optional, or proscribed. The allocation of communication among behavior settings differs from group to group: what, for example, is the distribution of required silence in a society—as opposed to occasions in which silence, being optional, can serve as a message. (To say that everything is communication is to make the term a metaphor of no use. If necessary, the wording could be changed to: not all behavior is message-sending . . . not all message-sending is lin-

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[5] Aberle (1960) argues that language has been an inadequate model for culture-and-personality studies, having only two terms, the individual and the shared cultural pattern, whereas a third term, the cultural system in which persons participate but do not share, is necessary. In Aberle's terms, I am saying here that the two-term model is inadequate for linguistics studies as well. "Ethnography of speaking" involves a speech equivalent of "cultural system."

guistic . . . etc.) The allocation of communicative means may also differ. For any group, some situations must be speech situations, some may be, some cannot be. Which situations require writing, derivative codes of singing, whistling, drumming, non-linguistic uses of the voice or instruments, or gesture? Are certain messages specialized to each means?

The distribution of acts and means of communication in the round of behavior is one level of description. Patterns of occurrence and frequency are one kind of comparison between groups. Much more complex is the analysis of the communicative event itself. (In discussing it, I shall refer to speech and speaking, but these terms are surrogates for all modes of communication, and a descriptive account should be generalized to comprise all.) Let me emphasize again that what I present is not a system to be imposed, but a series of questions to be asked. Hopefully, the questions will get at the ingredients, and from the ingredients to the structure of speaking in a group.

There seem to be three aspects of speech economy which it is useful to consider separately: *speech events,* as such; the *constituent factors* of speech events; and the *functions of speech.* With each aspect, it is a question of focus, and a full description of one is partly in terms of the rest.

Speech Events. For each aspect, three kinds of questions are useful. Taking first the speech events within a group, what are instances of speech events? What classes of speech events are recognized or can be inferred? What are the dimensions of contrast, the distinctive features, which differentiate them? (This will include reference to how factors are represented and functions served.) What is their pattern of occurrence, their distribution vis-a-vis each other and externally (in terms of total behavior or some selected aspect)?

One good ethnographic technique for getting at speech events, as at other categories, is through words which name them. Some classes of speech events in our culture are well known: Sunday morning sermon, inaugural address, pledge of allegiance. Other classes are suggested by colloquial expressions such as: heart-to-heart-talk, salestalk, talk man-to-man, woman's talk, bull session, chat, polite conversation, chatter (of a team), chew him out, give him the lowdown, get it off his chest, griping, etc. I know no structural analysis. Clearly the material cannot be culled from a dictionary alone: instances and classes of speech events may be labelled by quite diverse means, not only by nouns, but also by verbs, phrases, and sentences. In response to the question, "Nice talk?," a situation may be titled by the response "Couldn't get a word in edgewise."

Insofar as participants in a society conceive their verbal interaction in

terms of such categories, the criterial attributes and the distribution of these are worth discovering.

Take "cussing out," a Wishram Chinook's English label for a class of aboriginal speech events. A set of verb stems differentiates varieties of "cussing out." What alternative events (linguistic or non-linguistic) are possible in the same situation, such as dismissal or beating? With regard to factors, who cusses out whom, when and where, in what style or code, about what? With regard to functions, is there an æsthetic element, are speakers rated as to ability, what does "cussing out" do for speakers, what effect is expected or follows for hearers? What is the role of "cussing out" in maintenance of social system, cultural values, personality systems? (The analysis of Hausa *roka* [praise singing] by Smith [1957] is an interesting work along these lines, as is Conklin [1959].)

An interesting question about speech events concerns what can serve to close them, or to close a sequence within one.

Factors in Speech Events. Any speech event can be seen as comprising several components, and the analysis of these is a major aspect of an ethnography of speaking. Seven types of component or factor can be discerned. Every speech event involves (1) a Sender (Addresser); (2) a Receiver (Addressee); (3) a Message Form; (4) a Channel; (5) a Code; (6) a Topic; and (7) Setting (Scene, Situation).[6]

The set of seven types of factor is an initial ("etic") framework. For any group, the indigenous categories will vary in number and kind, and their instances and classes must be empirically identified. For example, Sender and Addresser, or Receiver and Addressee, need not be the same. Among the eastern Chinookan groups, a formal occasion is partly defined by the fact that the words of a chief or sponsor of a ceremony are repeated by a special functionary to the assembled people. In general, the categories of these two factors must be investigated in terms of the role system of the group studied. Moreover, depending upon beliefs and practices, the categories of Senders and Receivers variously overlap the membership of the human group. The coming of a flock of ravens brought warning for the Kwakiutl, and, indeed, there was a corresponding category of Receiver: an individual whose afterbirth had been eaten by ravens could, as an adult,

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[6] In what follows I am most immediately indebted to Roman Jakobson's presentation of factors and functions in his concluding remarks to the Conference on Style held at Indiana University, April 1958, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council. The published statement identifies six factors and corresponding functions (Jakobson 1960). Jakobson's rich discussion should be carefully read. I have also pervasive debts to Kenneth Burke, Kenneth L. Pike, Sinclair (1951) and Barker and Wright (1955).

perceive raven cries as one or another of a limited set of Kwakiutl utterances. A stone is one type of potential Sender among the Fox. Infants may or may not be counted as a class of potential Addressees and talked to; they were so counted among the Mohave and Tlingit, who thought infants capable of understanding speech. (The practice with infants and pets varies in our own society.)

The form of a Message, or the typical form of a class of Messages, is a descriptive fact that becomes significant especially as an æsthetic and stylistic matter, whether in relation to the resources of a code (Newman [1940] has shown that Yokuts and English stand in sharp contrast), to a particular context (Riffaterre [1959] takes this relation as fundamental to analysis of style), or to a particular referential content (as when some linguists find that the modifier "Trager-Smith" fits their sentence rhythms better as "Smith-Trager").

Cross-cultural differences in Channels are well known, not only the presence or absence of writing, but also the elaboration of instrumental channels among West African peoples such as the Jabo, the whistling of tones among some of the Mazatecs of Mexico, etc.

It has already been noted that the Code factor is a variable, given a focus on the speech habits of a population. The range is from communities with different levels of a single dialect to communities in which many individuals command several different languages. The presence of argots, jargons, forms of speech disguise, and the like enters here. Terms such as "dialect," "variety," "vernacular," "level," are much in discussion now (see Ferguson and Gumperz 1960, Hill 1958, Kenyon 1948). It is clear the status of a form of speech as a dialect, or language, or level, cannot be determined from linguistic features alone, nor can the categories be so defined. There is a sociocultural dimension (see Wolff 1959, on the non-coincidence of objective linguistic difference and communication boundary), and the indigenous categories must be discovered, together with their defining attributes and the import of using one or another in a situation. Depending on attitude, the presence of a very few features can stamp a form of speech as a different style or dialect.[7]

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[7] The phenomena which Voegelin treats as "casual" vs. "non-casual" belong here. Voegelin (1960) sees the need for an empirical, general approach to all forms of speech in a community, discussing their variation in number and kind between communities, and the situational restrictions on their use. His discussion takes "casual" as a residual, unmarked category, whereas the need is to assume that all speech manifests some positively marked level or style, and to discover the identifying traits. He generalizes that neither formal training nor specialized interest contribute to proficiency in casual speech, and that judgments of proficiency are not made, but

The Topic factor points to study of the lexical hierarchy of the languages spoken by a group, including idioms and the content of any conventionalized utterances, for evidence and knowledge of what can be said. To a large extent this means simply that semantic study is necessary to any study of speaking. An ethnography of speaking does also call special attention to indigenous categories for topics. One needs to know the categories in terms of which people will answer the question, "What are they talking about?," and the attributes and patterns of occurrence for these categories. The old rhetorical category of *topoi* might go here as well.

The Setting factor is fundamental and difficult. It underlies much of the rest and yet its constituency is not easily determined. We accept as meaningful such terms as "context of situation" and "definition of the situation" but seldom ask ethnographically what the criteria for being a "situation" might be, what kinds of situations there are, how many, and the like. Native terms are one guide, as is the work of Barker and Wright (1955) to determine *behavior settings* and to segment the continuum of behavior.[8]

Some of the import of these types of factors will be brought out with

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evaluations of proficiency among the Menominee (Bloomfield 1927) and the Crow (Lowie 1935) show that this implication of "casual" is misleading. Indeed, for some groups, most utterances might have to be classed in Voegelin's terms as "non-casual," for training in proper speaking is intensive and proficiency stressed (e. g., the Ngoni of Nysasaland and many groups in Ghana).

[8] Jakobson treats the last two factors (his Context and Referent) together as one factor. To stress my descriptive concern with factors, I eschew the theoretically laden term "Context" for a factor here, retaining "Setting" (cf. Barker and Wright 1955) with "Scene" (Burke 1945) and "Situation" (Firth 1935, following Malinowski) as alternatives. As factors, I distinguish Setting and Topic because the same statement may have quite different import, as between, say, a rehearsal and a performance. In one sense, it is simply a question of what one has to inventory in describing the speech economy of a group. Settings and Topics seem to me to involve two obviously different lists, and lists on the same level as Addressers, Addressees, Channels, etc. Put otherwise, "Who said it? Who'd he say it to? What words did he use? Did he phone or write? Was it in English? What'd he talk about? Where'd he say it?" seem to me all questions of the same order. With functions I cannot avoid using "Context". I agree with Jakobson that referential function involves context (as an earlier section makes plain), but find this no difficulty if a function may be defined in relation to more than one factor. I also agree with Jakobson that all aspects of a speech event are aspects of context from one point of view, but I have argued that all aspects may be viewed in terms of *any* one factor; and the level at which all are aspects of context merges all, not just context and reference, while the level at which the others are distinct seems to me to distinguish context and reference as well, as I hope the illustrations, especially the literary ones, show. Certainly if reference is less than the total import of a sentence, then shifting the line "And seal the hushèd casket of my soul" from early in the sonnet "To Sleep" to its close (as manuscripts show Keats did), enhanced the effect of the line and its contribution to the poem, without changing its reference.

regard to the functions of speech. With regard to the factors themselves, let us note again that native lexical categories are an important lead, and that contrast within a frame is a basic technique for identifying both instances and classes, and for discovering their dimensions of contrast.

Given the relevant instances and classes for a group, the patterning of their distribution can be studied. One way is to focus on a single instance or class, hold it constant, and vary the other components. As a sort of concordance technique, this results in an inventory, a description of an element in terms of the combinability of other elements with it. As a general distributional technique, this can discover the relations which obtain among various elements: whether co-occurrence is obligatory, or optional, or structurally excluded. Sometimes the relation will hold for only two elements (as when a certain category of Receiver may be addressed only by a certain category of Sender), sometimes for several. The relation may characterize a class of speech events.

In this way we can discover the rules of appropriateness for a person or group. (And indications that such rules have been violated are of special help in discovering them.) From a linguistic (Code) point of view, such rules may account for variance in the speech material on which a description is based, explaining why some grammatically possible utterances do not occur (e.g., to illustrate each type of factor: because the informant is not an appropriate Sender, the linguist not an appropriate Receiver, a different choice of words or order is preferred, the sequence is sung and cannot be dictated apart from that mode of channel, the sequence indicates a speech variety or level which the informant avoids or must not use, the topic is tabued, the situation which would elicit the utterance has never occurred or been imagined, such a thing is said only in a context to which the linguist has no access). From an ethnographic point of view, the discovery of such rules of appropriateness is of practical importance for participant observation, and it is central to the conception of speaking as a system. *One way that patterns of speaking constitute a system is in virtue of restrictions on the co-occurrence of elements.*

Relevant data have been noted by ethnographers, especially as incident to lexical items of interest, such as kin terms. Linguists have taken account of such data when intrusive into the formal code, as when different morphemic shapes or different paradigms are used according to the sex of the speaker and hearer. (Haas 1944 is the best treatment). The participants in speech may then be admitted as environments for use of the principle of complementary distribution, and the different forms treated as lexically or grammatically equivalent; but such data are likely to be regarded as a

frayed edge of grammar rather than as an opening into the broader system of speaking. (Such facts have sometimes served as casements for visions of different men's and women's "languages," but serious characterization of speech differences between men and women in a society hardly exists.)

A descriptive analysis of patterns of speaking in terms of indigenous instances of the constructive factors of speech events is worthwhile in its own right, and it feeds back into prediction and inference about behavior. Given a speech event in the limited sense of a concrete message, frequently the main interest is in what can be told about one or more of its constituent elements. What can be told about the Sender, either as to identity (age, sex, social class, and the like) or as to motive, attitude, personality? What can be told about the Receiver, including his or her likely response? About the Context (including antecedent circumstances, verbal or non-verbal)? And so on. (For the fieldworker or learning child, the question may be what can be told about the Code; for the communications engineer, what can be told about the Channel.) We may consider relations between elements, or consider all as evidence about a certain one.

The saliency of this focus is of course that it is what we often have to work with, namely, text of one sort or another. Inquiry of this sort is common in and out of science. But in our own society the success of such inquiry presupposes a knowledge of the relations—diagnostic, probabilistic—that obtain among the constitutive elements of speech events. We share in the patterns of speaking behind the text or message, and can to some extent ask ourselves, what would be different if the Sender were different? if the Sender's motive were different? and so on. In another society this contrast-within-a-frame technique must appeal to an explicit analysis of patterns of speaking.

Functions in Speech Events. The third aspect of speech events is that of function. Within anthropology the functions of speech (or language) have usually been discussed in terms of universal functions. While it is important to know the ways in which the functions of speaking are the same in every group and for every personality, our concern here is with the ways in which they differ. One way to approach this is to reverse the usual question, what does a language contribute to the maintenance of personality, society, and culture? and to ask instead, what does a personality, society, or culture contribute to the maintenance of a language? Especially if we ask the question in situations of culture change, we can see the various functional involvements of speech and of given languages.

Some students of standard languages have defined for them functions and correlative attitudes. These in fact apply to all languages, and serve to

contrast their roles. To illustrate: among the Hopi-Tewa the language serves prestige, unifying, and separatist functions, and there is great language pride as well as language loyalty. Among the Eastern Cherokee the hierarchy of functions seems just the reverse; the retention of the language serves mainly a separatist function, and there is an attitude of loyalty, but hardly of pride. Perhaps we think too much in terms of nineteenth-century European linguistic nationalism to notice that some languages do not enjoy the status of a symbol crucial to group identity. The Fulnío of Brazil have preserved group identity over three centuries by giving up their territory to maintain their language and major ceremony, but the Guayqueries of Venezuela have preserved group identity by maintaining a set of property relations. Of indigenous language and religion there has been no trace for generations. One suspects that the Guayqueries' involvement with their language differed from that of the Fulnío.

When only a few speakers of a language are left in a community, the survival of the language becomes almost entirely dependent on its manifest and latent functions for the personalities concerned. Thus Swanton rescued an important and independent Siouan language, Ofo, partly by luck; he happened to be in the unsuspected presence of the last speaker, and followed up a chance remark. But it was partly due to the personality of the woman, who could be an informant because she had practiced the language frequently to herself in the years since all other speakers had died.

These examples of the broad functional involvements of speech, and of languages, raise questions that can be answered only within general ethnography or social anthropology. While the same holds for an ethnography of speaking at other points, insofar as it is a special focus and not a separate subject-matter, it looms large here because the necessary conceptual framework exists almost entirely outside linguistics. There are still points and progress to be made, however, by concentrating on the linguistic discussions of the functions of speech in terms of the constructive factors of the speech event.

Within the tradition of linguistics, functions of speech have commonly been an interpretation of factors of the speech event in terms of motive or purpose, obtaining a set of functions, one for each factor discriminated. Sometimes a particular feature, a linguistic category, or literary genre is associated with a function. For example, the 1st person pronoun, interjections, and the lyric poem have been associated with expressive function (focus on the Sender within the speech event); the 2nd person pronoun,

imperatives, and rhetoric or dramatic poetry with the directive function; and the 3rd person pronoun, and epic poetry, with the referential function.[9]

Some conception of speech functions must figure in any theory of behavior, if it is to give any account of speaking. The same holds for an account of language in a theory of culture. Indeed, rival views on many issues involving speech can best be interpreted as involving differing assump- tions about the importance or existence of various functions. For an eth- nography of speaking, then, the question is not, should it have a conception of speech functions, but, what should that conception be?

There can be only a preliminary outline at present, and, as a guide for field work, its concern should be for scope and flexibility. It should not conceive the functions of speech too narrowly, as to number or domain, and it should not impose a fixed set of functions. While some general classes of function are undoubtedly universal, one should seek to establish the particu- lars of the given case, and should be prepared to discover that a function identifiable in one group is absent in another.

One can point to seven broad types of function, corresponding to the seven types of factor already enumerated. (Each type can be variously named, and the most appropriate name may vary with circumstances; alternatives are given in parentheses.) The seven are: (1) Expressive (Emotive); (2) Directive (Conative, Pragmatic, Rhetorical, Persuasive); (3) Poetic; (4) Contact; (5) Metalinguistic; (6) Referential (7) Con- textual (Situational).

In the simplest case, each of the types of function can be taken as focussing upon a corresponding type of factor, and one can single out questions and comments, and units as well, that primarily are associated with each.

"You say it with such feeling" points to expressive function, and a language may have units which are conventionally expressive, such as French [h] ("Je te H'aime") and English vowel length ("What a fiiiiiiiine boy"), used to convey strong feeling. (A feature can be conventionally an expressive device only where it is not referential, i.e., for phonic features, not functioning phonemically to differentiate lexical items.) "Do as I say,

[9] Snell (1952) attempts to subsume all linguistic features, including parts of speech and grammatical categories, under Bühler's classification of three types of linguistic function ("Auslösung," "Kundgabe," "Darstellung," equivalent to Snell's "Wirkungs-, Ausdrucks- und Darstellungsfunktion," and corresponding to directive, expressive, and referential function here). This might be valuable to the coding of personality expression in speech. But Snell's linguistic base is narrowly within Indo-European, the application is *a priori*, and three functions are not enough. His work has been reviewed as interesting, but not convincing (Winter 1953).

not do as I do" points to directive function, and imperatives have been cited as primarily directive units. "What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed" points to poetic function, focussed on message form, as does "The sound must seem an echo to the sense." Feet, lines, and metrical units generally are primarily poetic in function. "If only I could talk it instead of having to write it" and "Can you hear me?" point to contact function; breath groups may be channel units, in the case of speaking, as are pages in the case of print. "Go look it up in the dictionary" points to metalinguistic function, to concern with the code underlying communication; words such as "word," and technical linguistic terms, which make talk about the code possible, serve primarily metalinguistic function. Quotation marks have metalinguistic function when they signal that a form is being cited or glossed, but channel function when enclosing quoted or imagined speech. "What are you going to talk about?," "What did he have to say?" focus on topic and point to referential function. Most lexical and grammatical units are primarily referential, and are analyzed by descriptive linguistics in terms of that function. "When will you tell him?," "As mentioned above," "You can't talk like that here!!," "If you're going to use that scene at all, you'll have to put it later in the play," are primarily contextual in function, as are a sign flashing "On the Air" and the statement of scene at the beginning of an act of a play ("[Elsinore. A platform before the castle]").

All features of the speech event, including all features of the linguistic code, may participate in all of the functions. This point must be made, because certain features are often treated exclusively in terms of a single function. But, as Kenneth Burke has pointed out, any utterance, for example, even an interjection, may secondarily serve as a title for contexts to which it is appropriate, and hence have a referential aspect. Some interpret the linguistic code as a series of levels entirely in terms of referential function, and see other functions, such as the expressive, as pertaining only to the level of the entire utterance and beyond. Of course all functions (including the referential) come into play only at the level of the utterance; no utterance, no functions. But when analytical matters are in question, all functions have to be discussed with regard to all levels. Not only are there conventional expressive units corresponding to each level of the code, but a wide range of functions can be illustrated with regard to a unit such as the phoneme. Although the initial task of descriptive analysis is to treat phonemes in their contribution to referential function (identifying and differentiating utterances), this does not exhaust their functional involvement. To take /p/ as an example: expressively, Burke has noted "two kinds of p," the heavily aspirated one conveying distaste and rejection

(1957:12ff.). Patterning of /p/s can participate in poetic function, organiz-ing the middle line of a stanza by Wallace Stevens, "The romantic intoning, the declaimed clairvoyance/Are parts of apotheosis, appropriate/And of its nature, the idiom thereof!" The functional load of /p/ in a community cannot be analyzed apart from the nature and use of various channels, as when among the Pima the functional load of /p/ differs between singing and recitation, or as when among the Jabo of Liberia a drum does not differentiate /p/ from other consonants, but signals only the occurrence of the type. Conventional names for phonemes, permitting them to be discussed in the abstract, have to do with metalinguistic function, and even a quite simple society may have a term that names a distinctive feature such as nasalization (Halkomelem Salish s'amqsən (ˈqsən 'nose'); see description of the circumstances in Elmendorf and Suttles [1960], p.7). As abbreviation, "P" may mediate reference, as when on an athletic uniform it signifies the school, or when large vs. small "P" distinguishes the winners of letters in major vs. minor sports. If uniforms worn in games bear the letter, and prac-tice jerseys do not, the element (such as "P") has contextual function. In such cases the phonological structure of the language conditions what occurs.

These illustrations are minor, but if features conceived as most internal to the code, most removed from external involvement, participate in a variety of functions, the argument serves for features generally. To restrict lin-guistic description or psychological study to speech habits conceived only in terms of referential function is to restrict understanding, especially of aspects of speech important to behavior and the formation of personality. If the meaning of a linguistic form is defined as the total disposition to use it, then several functions play a part in meaning, since all contribute to the total disposition. Analysis in terms of referential function comes first, so that other functions may be set aside for an interval; but this cannot be a permanent strategy.

These illustrations are simply pointers to broad areas. In a given case and with regard to, say, expressive function, one would want to discover the inventory of units which could conventionally serve expressive function, as well as the kinds of inference about expressiveness made by participants in speech events in the group, and the evidence underlying such inferences. One would expect groups to differ in number of conventional expressive units and in the frequency of their use, as well as in kinds of inference made as to expressiveness, and the features (of whatever sort) used as evidence. One would seek to identify the kinds of expressive function recog-nized or implicit in the behavior of the group. A Sender can not help but express attitudes towards each of the other factors in a speech event, his

audience, the style of his message, the code he is using, the channel he is using, his topic, the scene of his communication. An external observer can of course interpret a speech event as expressive in terms of all of these, by attending to each in turn. But the primary ethnographic problem is to deter-mine which kinds of expressive function, any or all, are present as intended or perceived by the participants of the speech event. Which are, so to speak, being "encoded" and "decoded"? Similarly, one could investigate a speech event entirely with regard to directive function, or, with regard to metalinguistic function, one could attend exclusively to evidence of shared signal systems, not only the grammar and dictionary which serve referential function, but the degree to which there are codes for expressive and other functions.

One would seek, as with other aspects of speech events, to discover the dimensions of contrast among functions, and the patterns of their occurrence in the behavior of the group.

To study the distribution of speech functions in the round of behavior raises several difficult problems. The first problem is that of the relation of particular functions to particular instances or classes of speech event. The same speech event can be viewed in terms of all seven types of function, and variously so. (A given utterance of "Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more," might be taken as expressive of Shakespeare, Henry V, or Laurence Olivier; as directive and determinant of the subsequent action of soldiers or actors; as exemplifying iambic pentameter blank verse and as worse or better than an alternative such as "Once more, once more into the breach, dear friends"; as more effective when heard than when read; as evidence for the phonemic system of author or actor; as telling something about the progress of the siege of Harfleur; as signalling, should someone enter at that point, that it is Shakespeare's play and/or just past the pro-logue of Act III.) Even narrowing the perspective to that of a single participant in the situation, more than one function is usually present in a given speech event. Jakobson's way of handling this is to consider that all types of functions are always compresent, and to see a given speech event as characterized by a particular hierarchy of functions. There are clear cases of the validity of this approach, as when expressive function (signalled perhaps by intonation) dominates referential function, and there are in-teresting cases of its manipulation, as when a teen-age daughter protests, "But all I said was . . .," editing out the intonation that had been perceived as insult. She is claiming the privileged status generally ascribed to the referential function in our culture. Our cultural view is the opposite of the . fact, however, if the Dutch linguist de Groot (1949) is right in his "Law

of the Two Strata," which asserts that whenever the referential and expressive import of a message conflict, the expressive import is overriding. Such conflict had been noted by Sapir (1931), and it underlies Bateson's concept of the "double bind" of many children who become schizophrenic. Conflict, however, raises doubt that all messages can be analyzed in terms of a hierarchy of functions such that one function is dominant. The defining characteristic of some speech events may be a balance, harmonious or conflicting, between more than one function. If so, the interpretation of a speech event is far from a matter of assigning it to one of seven types of function.

This brings us to a second problem, that of the relation of particular functions to the constituent factors of speech events. Although types of function have been presented in a preliminary way as correlates of types of factor, the relationships between the two are more complex. Indeed, it would be a great mistake to analyze an actual situation as if each type of factor simply determined a single type of function.

Here is where an ethnographic approach diverges perhaps from that sketched by Jakobson. Jakobson's work represents a decisive advance for anthropology and linguistics. It inspires concern with speech functions, which have had only sporadic attention in recent years; it breaks with the confinement of most schemes to two or three functions (referential : expressive : conative),[10] and it recognizes that all features of a message may participate in all functions. But regarding the relation of functions to factors, Jakobson states:

> Each of these six factors determines a different function of language. Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfill only one function. The diversity lies not in monopoly of some one of these several functions, but in a different hierarchical order of functions. The verbal structure of a message depends primarily on the predominant function. (Jakobson 1960:353)

The divergence may be only verbal, however, since Jakobson has subsequently said that "determine" is not the right word, and that rather each type of function is focussed upon, centered upon a given factor. Such a view does not exclude participation of more than one. Certainly it is doubtful that particular functions of a concrete case can ever be defined in terms

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[10] When earlier work distinguishes more than two or three functions, it usually is elaborating within one of these. Ogden and Richards list five functions in *The Meaning of Meaning*, but their focus is on the Sender's intention, and the elaboration falls within the expressive type.

of factors singly. The definition seems always to involve two or more factors (or instances or classes within a type of factor).

Thus, the expressive function of features must be defined in relation to referential function. The function which Malinowski called "phatic communion" can be taken as a kind of alternating or reciprocal expressive function of speech, as when housewives exchange stories about their children or anthropologists about their field work. Now, having designated a factor of "CONTACT, a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication" (p. 353), Jakobson correlates with it "messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication to check whether the channel works ('Hello, do you hear me?'), to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention" and places "phatic communion" here ("This set for CONTACT, or in Malinowski's terms PHATIC function" [p. 355]). The psychological connection between participants in communication seems to me significantly independent of the nature and state of the channel, and referrable primarily to them rather than to it. Messages to establish, prolong or discontinue communication may neither intend nor evoke a sense of communion; there may be a clear channel and no rapport. The resolution is probably to take the reference to "a physical channel" and "psychological connection" as indicating two main subtypes of contact function. (Thomas Sebeok has pointed out the importance of the factor of noise also in relation to analysis of channel and contact). In any case, if phatic communion is a function of speech in the behavior of a group, it must be identified empirically and particulars given as to participants and situations. Even if universal, phatic communion differs greatly in its occasions and importance from group to group, and ethnographically cannot be read off as the equivalent of one factor.

More striking is the case of the factor of Message Form. This cannot be associated directly or univocally with Poetic function. The relation between a printed message and a Receiver (not Addressee) acting as proof-reader is a pure and obvious case of a function associated with message-form. And the more the proof-reader can divorce his response to the message-form from concern with any other aspect, especially reference, the better. Moreover, any sustained concern with the poetic aspect of message-form must take it in relation with other factors. Use of phonic substance is interpretable only in relation to reference: the phonemes in "The murmuring of innumerable bees" suggest bee-sound only in connection with the topic announced by the meaning of the words. (Pope's passage on "The sound must seem an echo to the sense" illustrates this.) Recent work on criteria

for stylistic analysis has taken as fundamental that the stylistic value of a feature depends upon its perception in relation to a delimited verbal context (Riffaterre 1959). (Jakobson has subsequently explained that the label "poetic" should not be misleading; in his view "poetic" function need not concern poetry, but concerns any case of *einstellung* on the message, so that the message becomes from a certain point of view self-sufficient. Poetry as such would thus be but a principal sub-type, proof-reading perhaps a minor one).

In general, a message or feature has a particular function in behavior only for specified classes of participants in the speech event. An act of speech may have directive, yet no referential value, for someone who knows nothing of the language involved. Many misunderstandings arise from situations in which the referential value of a message is understood, but not the expressive or directive import, because the Receiver does not share the Sender's conventional understandings, or code, for these. In short, speech functions must be defined in contexts of use.

The distribution of speech functions brings out one of the ways in which speaking constitutes a system. If the speech economy of a group is stated in terms of the interdependence of various factors, this constitutes a simple system. The statement that combinations of factors are not all possible, are not chance, but governed by rules, is an example. To constitute a functional system, the speech economy would have to be not only analyzable into a structure of parts, but also be such that the condition of some of these parts determines whether a certain property G will occur in the system; the parts are subject to variation such that if nothing compensates for the variation, G will no longer occur; if one (or some) of these parts vary within certain limits, the other of these parts will vary so as to compensate for the "initial variation" and G will be maintained; if one (or some) of these parts vary beyond certain limits, compensation will be impossible and G will no longer occur. When these conditions are met, the parts of the system can be called "functional" with respect to G. (Nagel 1953, 1956. I am indebted to Francesca Wendel Cancian at this point.)

It is easy to see how phonemes constitute a functional system, as when variation in one is compensated for by variation in another to maintain phonemic distinction. Such interpretation is well known in linguistics, and indeed, phonemic theory such as that of André Martinet (1955) should be better known as an example of a structural-functional theory of change. Interpretation of speaking in such terms is a challenge that has not generally been met. For any one speech function in the behavior of a group, the various factors (Sender, Receiver, etc.) can be taken as state-coordinates

whose values vary within certain limits to maintain it. Communication can be taken as a cover-term for most of the specific functions, or as a very general function in its own right. If it is taken as a property being maintained, we can see that it in fact may depend upon the values of other functions. This might be in terms of a whole community, as in the analysis of the maintenance or loss of intelligibility between dialects. Let us consider single speech events. The members of a group have conceptions and expectations as to the distribution of speech functions among situations, and insofar as several functions are compresent, it is a matter of expectations as to relative hierarchy. These expectations may be anything from formal cultural norms to the projection of individual needs. If two persons meet, and perceive the situation in terms of conflicting hierarchies of speech function, communication will be broken off or the other person silently judged unfavorably, unless adjustment is made.

Let us take the relation of expressive and referential functions, broadly conceived. A group of wives may be chatting about personal experiences with children. If another woman insists on exact information, she is failing to perceive dominance of expressive or phatic function in the situation. Polite inquiry is appropriate, but not persistent challenge as to fact. Or a group of wives may be discussing children in behavioral science terms. If another woman interposes purely associative and biographical comments about her own children, she is failing to perceive the dominance of a referential function. Evidence is appropriate, but not anecdotes irrelevant to the views and theory being exchanged. In either case, the offender may be excluded from communication, or avoided under similar circumstances later. A good deal of interpersonal behavior can be examined in similar terms. In general, instances of the breaking off of communication, or uneasiness in it, are good evidence of the presence of a rule or expectation about speaking, including differences in functional hierarchy.

Three aspects of speech economy have been outlined now, the speech events, their constitutive factors, and various types of functions. Each is one perspective on the whole of verbal behavior, and full description of each must be partly in terms of the others. An approach in these terms should be useful whether one's interest is a comparative study of human behavior, or the behavior typical of a group, or the varying behavior of individuals within a group.

SPEECH IN SOCIALIZATION

I now want to survey the role of speaking in socialization. In one sense this role is one part of the kind of descriptive analysis that has been pro-

posed. In another sense, it is a question of the induction of new recruits into the ongoing adult system. Whichever perspective is chosen, and we often shift back and forth in ordinary thinking, it is worthwhile to single out speech in socialization because, from a comparative viewpoint, it has been entirely neglected; there is far too little attention to it in the study of individual groups; and it presumably underlies much of the variation in individual adult behavior.

Studies of the child's acquisition of speech have concentrated on mastery of the code for referential function. Far too few such studies have been informed by modern linguistics as to the structural nature of what it is the child learns, but the number is increasing. Adequate studies of the child's acquisition of the other functions of speech have been more or less unknown to American linguistics and anthropology, but recently the work of Russian psychologists on the directive function has gained recognition (Luria 1959; Luria and Yurovich 1959). The Russian scholars consider the child's acquisition of speech ("the secondary signalling system") in interaction with adults as fundamental to the child's development of control over its own behavior and of its picture of the world. Their experimental work has shown that the development of capacity to understand an utterance (referential function) does not have as automatic consequence the capacity to respond adequately, to have behavior directed by it. The capacity for the directive functioning of speech develops independently and by stages in the first years of life. Thus before the age of $1\frac{1}{2}$ years a child responds to a verbal request for a toy fish by getting and handing the object, but is not able to do so if another toy (say a cat) is closer, and between it and the fish. It will orient toward the object named, but maintain the directive function of the word only until the external situation (the toy cat) conflicts, then grasp and offer the intervening toy. At 3 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ years, if a child is to perform a certain task of pressing a ball, it will not achieve the necessary control over its responses if simply given preliminary verbal instructions, but if it gives itself the appropriate verbal commands, it will succeed. At this age, however, the success is only for positive commands. If the child gives itself the command "Don't press," it not only fails to stop pressing, but presses even harder. Only at the age of 4 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ years does the verbal command "Don't press" actually acquire inhibitory effect, according to these studies.

Thus the directive function of speech depends partly upon maturation, and is partly independent of the dependence upon maturation of control of referential function. As for another salient function, the expressive, observations indicate that it begins to be acquired quite early. Expressive use of

intonation and other features may precede referential control. In short, the three most prominent types of function (referential, expressive, directive) appear to develop in childhood in partial independence of each other and in varying relation to the process of maturation.

It also appears that mastery of these functions varies in education and adult life. The basic patterns of the referential function, of grammar and lexicon, are shared as prerequisites to the maintenance of communication at all. There are of course differences at some levels of control of resources for reference. And there seems to be a quite looser rein as to the other functions and greater individual variability. Individuals differ greatly, for example, in control of intonation patterns in our society; some never learn the right intonation for announcing a joke, and some, having learned a certain intonation as students, as part of a pattern of quick repartee, carry it in later life into situations in which it acts to cut off every conversational sequence. And if we extend our horizon from the usual scope of linguistic descriptions to the full repertoire of conventional linguistic habits, to the recurrent linguistic routines and situational idioms of daily verbal behavior, variation in individual mastery is even more apparent. The consequences range from social discomfort to exclusion from or failure in significant areas of activity, because ignorant or maladroit; or, on the other hand, recruitment for and success in certain areas, because adept. There may be a consequence for the possibility of psychotherapy. Such differences may characterize whole subcultures that in basic patterns share the same language.[11]

Concern with differences in individual verbal behavior leads to concern with differences in the role of speech in socialization, and through that, to differences which obtain between groups, whether subcultures or whole societies. Russian psychologists emphasize that the vital functions of speech are acquired in interaction with adults, but seem not to consider the consequences for their experimental norms of different cultural patterns of interaction. This lack they share with most writers, who, if they point out the socialization importance of language, do so in a generic way.[12]

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[11] Cf. the work now being done by Basil Bernstein (1958, 1959, 1960a, 1960b, 1961). He contrasts two modes of speech, *formal* and *public,* associated with the English middle-class and lower-class, respectively. Bernstein finds that the two modes arise because two social strata place different emphases on language potential, that once this emphasis is placed, the resulting modes of speech progressively orient speakers to different types of relationships to objects and persons, and that this is reflected in differences of verbal intelligence test scores, of verbal elaboration of subjective intent, and otherwise.

[12] George Herbert Mead is one example. Another is A. Irving Hallowell, whose inventory article on "Culture, Personality, and Society" states: "A necessary condition for socialization in man is the learning and use of a language. But different

The role of speech in socialization, the context of its acquisition, may vary in every aspect of the patterning of speech events, factors, and functions. Some kinds of variation can be highlighted in a notes-and-queries way with respect to the speech materials and resources available, the processes often stressed in study of personality formation, social structure and organization, and cultural values and beliefs.

What are the cognitive and expressive resources of the linguistic codes of the community? What portion of these are available to children, to what extent and in what sequence? Among the Nupe there are few terms for sexual matters and most knowledge about them is acquired by observation and experience. If there is more than one linguistic code, which is learned first, if either is? (Among the Chontal of Oaxaca, children learn a "second language," Spanish, first, in the home, and Chontal and some other aspects of native culture only in adolescence.) Is there a specialized baby-talk? If so, what is its content (referential, expressive, directive)? Are there verbal games, perhaps metalinguistic in that they draw attention to features of the code as such? (Since much significance has been attached to the child's acquisition of personal pronouns, and means of self-reference, these should be singled out.) What are the *linguistic routines* which the child is taught or can acquire?

A linguistic routine is a recurrent sequence of verbal behavior, whether conventional or idiosyncratic. Its pattern may be obvious and concrete, as in single sequences such as the numerals 1 to 10, the days of the week, the ABC's, or as in antiphonal sequences such as many children's games, as well as adult games and ceremonies. Or the pattern may not be obvious because it is not concrete, but consists of some regular sequence of emotion or topic. Instruction may be couched as "Then he says . . . and then you say . . .," but often it is not a matter of the exact words. (In magic and instruction from supernatural helpers, of course, often it is.) Or it may be a formal pattern such as a limerick. Feedback may be involved, and the patterning of the routine resemble a branching tree diagram. (A good "line" or salesman's pitch has alternative ways of reaching the same goal.) A vast portion of verbal behavior in fact consists of recurrent patterns, of linguistic routines. Description has tended to be limited to those with a manifest structure, and has not often probed for those with an implicit pattern. Analysis of routines includes identification of idiomatic units, not only greeting formulas and the like, but the full range of utterances which

languages are functionally equivalent in this respect, and one language is comparable with another because human speech has certain common denominators" (Hallowell 1953:612).

acquire conventional significance, for an individual, group, or whole culture. Description is usually limited to idioms of phrase length which, because their reference is not predictable from their parts, must be independently listed in a dictionary as lexical units (e.g., "kick the bucket"). Even for clear referential categories such as those of place and personal names, a carefully considered description of the status and formation of idioms is rare (see Hoijer 1948:182-3 for a fine example), and conventionalization in terms of other functions is important in behavior and personality formation. There are utterances conventionalized in metalinguistic and contextual function, but especially interesting here are those with directive or expressive function. A child's play in imitation of adult roles, as a girl with her dolls, may reveal many of the conventionalized sequences of her family—sequences which have recurred in situations until in some sense they "name," "stand for" the situation and carry a significance, expressive or directive, not predictable from their constituent parts. A mother may find herself using expressions to her child that her own mother had used to her, and with horror, having sworn as a child never to do so.

The number and range of such idioms varies between individuals, families, groups. These and linguistic routines play a great part in the verbal aspect of what Lantis (1960) points to as "vernacular culture," the handling of day-to-day situations, and they are essential in verbal art, in the oral performance of myths, sung epics, many speeches and lectures. The text of these is not identical from one performance to the next, but the general sequence is more or less constant, and most of the verbal content is drawn from a standard repertoire. They fill the slots of a speech, as words fill the slots of a sentence. (Their presence can sometimes be detected when a performer finds himself not communicating. Sequences which he has drawn on as ready coin may prove to have no conventional value for a new audience, which struggles for an interpretation of something intended merely as formulas or labels.) The acquisition of conventional sequences, both idioms and routines, is a continuous process in life, and herein resides some of the theoretical interest, for to a great extent these sequences exist in the cambium between idiosyncrasy and culture. They exhibit persisting effort toward the patterning and predictability of behavior. Some sequences become idiomatic for a person or group because of a memorable novelty (see Hockett 1958:304ff.), but more because sensed as appropriate or as needed. Most do not achieve generality or persistence, but some would lose value if they did, being intended or enjoyed as distinctive, or private to a few.

Turning to the formation of personality, how does speaking figure in

the economy of punishment and reward, as alternative to physical acts (spanking, hugging) and to deprivation or giving of things such as candy? At what stage in psycho-sexual development is pressure about speech applied, if any is? How intensive is it? Autobiographical materials from Ghanian students reveal great childhood anxiety about speech. When is socialization pressure about weaning, toilet-training, self-feeding and the like applied in relation to the child's verbal development? In some groups it is after the demands can be verbally explained, in some not. What is the incidence of stuttering and other speech defects, if any? There is evidence that this depends upon socialization pressures, being absent in some groups, and perhaps among the Pilagá characteristic of girls rather than, as among us, of boys. If there is bilingualism, do speech defects appear in both or but one language? How much does speech figure in the transmission of skills and roles? Among some groups, such as the Kaska (Canada), it figures very little. Does a baby talk facilitate or retard acquisition of adult speech patterns? Is speaking a source of pleasure, of oral, perhaps erotic gratification? That some languages are extremely rich in vocabulary showing sound symbolism, some quite poor, suggests differential enjoyment of the phonic substance of language.

From the viewpoint of the social system of the group, how does speaking enter into definition of the roles acquired or observed by children? In what ways does this determine or reflect how speaking is acquired? How relatively significant is speaking in aggressive roles, such as that of warrior? of shaman or priest? (Perhaps the role of speaking in interaction with parents will correspond to the role of speaking in interaction with enemies or the supernatural.) How do residence rules, marriage rules, and the like affect the composition of the household in which the child learns to speak? In affecting the number and relative ages of children, these things affect the rate of mastery of adult speech patterns; there is evidence that singletons master speech more rapidly, children near the same age less rapidly, twins most slowly. Twins and children near the same age may develop and rely on their own verbal code vis-a-vis each other. If there is multilingualism, are the roles and settings of the languages kept distinct? If so, the child probably will acquire the languages without confusion, but if not, there may be personality difficulties. Are there situations and roles in which it is necessary to translate between two languages? If not, the child may very well master each without acquring ability to do so. Such external factors have much to do with the effect of multilingualism on personality, including cognitive structure. In what settings are children required to speak, forbidden, permitted? What proportion of total behavior settings for the group

permit the presence and speaking of children? A Russian visitor to France was astonished when the children of his host kept silent at the table; Russian children would have been reprimanded for *not* joining in the conversation with a guest.

The values and beliefs of the group of course pervade all this. What are the beliefs regarding children as participants in speech? Some believe neonates capable of understanding speech. The Ottawa believed the cries of infants to be meaningful, and had specialists in their interpretation. The Tlingit believed the talk of women to be the source of conflict among men, and an amulet was placed in a baby girl's mouth to make her taciturn. Are skill and interest in speech demanded, rewarded, ignored, or perhaps repressed? The Ngoni of Nyasaland value skill in speech, believing it part of what constitutes a true Ngoni, and so take pains to instill it in children and maintain it in adults. The remarkable polyglot abilities of Ghanian students in Europe perhaps reflect similar values in their own cultures. What values are held and transmitted with regard to the language or languages spoken? We have noted presence and absence of pride as between the Hopi-Tewa and Eastern Cherokee. The problem of bilingualism among immigrant children in the United States has been noted as one of the sense of inferiority associated with the non-English language. Concern for excellence of speech seems universal, but the degree and manifestation vary. Some groups tolerate sloppy pronunciation, some do not. If baby talk is present, is it believed easier for children? In sounds and forms it may in fact be as hard as the adult equivalents, and have the latent function of delaying the child's acquisition of these. What evidential status is accorded the statements of children? What degree and kind of intellectual awareness of speaking is present? What folk conceptions of a metalinguistic sort, as reflected in words for linguistic features or the abstraction of these for use in games and speech surrogates? Neighboring dialects may differ, as when one group of Mazatec abstract the tones of their language for a whistled code, while the Soyaltepec Mazatec do not. Bloomfield (1927) has ascribed the erroneous and sometimes injurious folk conceptions about language in our own culture to mistaken generalization from learning of writing, a later and conscious matter, relative to the largely unconscious learning of speech. Values and beliefs regarding speaking, or a language, may be interwoven with major institutions, and much elaborated, or peripheral and sketchy.

CONCLUSION

Speech cannot be omitted from a theory of human behavior, or a special

theory for the behavior of a particular group. But whether we focus on the cognitive or expressive or directive role of verbal behavior, or on the role of speech in socialization, we find a paucity of descriptive analysis of "ethological" studies of speaking in context. There are to be sure many studies that are in one way or another linguistic. But either speaking is taken for granted, or used as means to other ends, or only special kinds of speaking (or writing) are valued and considered. Of speaking as an activity among other activities, of the analysis of its patterns and functions in their own right, there is little. There are bits of data and anecdotes, and a variety of conceptual schemes which impinge, but there are no well focussed field studies or systematic theories. The angle of vision has not been such as to bring speaking into focus.

Herein lies the responsibility for the degree of sterility that has dogged a good deal of anthropological discussion of language and culture. The relation between language and culture seems a problem, it crops up whenever a thoughtful anthropologist tries to construct an integrated view of culture or behavior, yet discussion usually trails off irresolutely. We may set language and culture side by side, and try to assess similarities and differences; or we may try to see if something, a method or a model, that has worked for language will work for culture; or we may look to a future of point-for-point comparisons, once all partial cultural systems have been neatly analyzed; or we may redefine or subdivide the problem. We do not want to usher language out of culture; a suggestion to that effect some years ago was quickly suppressed. But having kept language within culture, many seem not very sure what to do about it (except perhaps to recall that some of our brightest friends are linguists, and a credit to the profession).

I do not want to seem to reject efforts such as those characterized above: In particular, there is much to be gained from a determination of the properties of language which are generically cultural and those which are not. The search for formal analogues between linguistics and other systems can be revealing, and some extensions of linguistic-like methodology to other areas of culture seem quite important. Indeed, I would see linguistics in this case as an avenue for the introduction into anthropology of qualitative mathematics. But successes along these lines will not put an end to the language-and-culture problem. It will remain uneasily with us because of the terms in which it is posed, terms which preclude an ultimate solution, if we think of such a solution as being a general theory of culture or of behavior that will integrate the phenomena we consider linguistic with the rest. The difficulty is that we have tried to relate language, described largely as a formal isolate, to culture, described largely without reference to speaking. We

have tried to relate one selective abstraction to another, forgetting that much that is pertinent to the place of speech in behavior and culture has not been taken up into either analytic frame. The angle of vision has been in effect a bifurcated one, considering speech primarily as evidence either of formal linguistic code or of the rest of culture.

Why has this been so? Neglect of speaking seems tolerable, I think, because of several working assumptions. Speech as such has been assumed to be without system; its functions have been assumed to be universally the same; the object of linguistic description has been assumed to be more or less homogeneous; and there has been an implicit equation of one language = one culture.

To put these working assumptions in qualified form: (a) the relation of language to speech has been conceived as that of figure to ground. Structure and pattern have been treated in effect as pretty much the exclusive property of language (*la langue* : *la parole*). For speech as a physical phenomenon, there is a truth to this view. The qualitatively discrete units of the linguistic code stand over against continuous variation in the stream of speech. For speech as a social phenomenon, the case is different. Speaking, like language, is patterned, functions as a system, is describable by rules.[13]

(b) The functions of speech have been of concern only with regard to properties judged (correctly or not) to be universal. Or, if differences have been of concern, these have been differences in the content of the code, along Whorfian lines, not differences in speaking itself. Speaking as a variable in the study of socialization has been largely ignored. (Speaking is not even mentioned in the section on "Oral Behavior" of the article, "Sociali-zation," in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* [Child 1954]).

(c) Descriptive method has been concerned with a single language or dialect, isolable as such and largely homogeneous. There has been much concern for neatness and elegance of result, and often a readiness to narrow the object of attention so as to achieve this. The object may be defined as one or a few idiolects, the habits of one or a few individuals (and in their roles as speakers, not as receivers); awkward data have often been excluded, if they could be identified as loanwords or a difference of style. The homo-geneously conceived object has been a standpoint from which to view speech phenomena in general. Looking out from it, many speech phenomena appear as variation in or of it, due perhaps to personality, social level, or situation.

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13 Because the distinction *la langue* : *la parole* usually implies that only the former has structure, Pike has rejected it (1960:52). I follow him in assuming that *la parole* has structure also, but believe that the distinction can be usefully retained. Within Pike's system, it can perhaps be treated as a difference in focus,

Recently the support for a broader conception of the object of linguistic attention has increased, through concern with bilingual description, a unified structure for several dialects, the relations between standard and colloquial varieties of languages, and the like. But most such work remains tied to the conception of a single language as primary and the locus of structure. Gleason has shown concern for "generalizations about linguistic variation as a characteristic feature of language. Here is the basis for a second type of linguistic science" (1955:285ff.). But this second type of linguistic science is seen as thoroughly statistical, in contrast to the qualitative nature of descriptive linguistics. The possibility for a second type of linguistic science that is structural is not conceived.

(d) Multilingualism of course has never been denied, but the use of linguistic units in ethnological classification, a prevailing cultural rather than societal focus, an individuating outlook, all have favored thinking of one language = one culture.

The sources of these working assumptions cannot be traced here, except to suggest that they are an understandable part of the ideology of linguistics and anthropology during their development in the past two generations. One need has been to refute fallacies about primitive languages, to establish the equality of all languages *sub specie scientia,* and this has been in accord with the relativistic message of cultural anthropology. To pursue differences in function among languages might seem to give aid' and comfort to the ethnocentric. Another need has been to secure the autonomy of the formal linguistic code as an object of study, apart from race, culture, history, psychology, and to develop the appropriate methods for such study. The complexity and fascination of this task turns attention away from speech, and concentrates it on the regularities of the code. Not all variables can be handled at once. Part of the anthropological background has been noted in (d) above. We should add' that where the one language = one culture equation has been conceptually dissolved, it has been in terms of historical independence, rather than in terms of complex social *inter*dependence between, say, several languages in a single culture.

Now it is desirable to change these assumptions, and to take as a work' ing framework: (1) the speech of a group constitutes a system; (2) speech and language vary cross-culturally in function; (3) the speech activity of a community is the primary object of attention. A descriptive grammar deals with this speech activity in one frame of reference, an ethnography of speaking in another. So (what amounts to a corollary, 3b), the latter must in fact include the former. The number of linguistic codes comprised in the ethnography of speaking of a group must be determined empirically.

Nothing said here should be taken to belittle linguistics and philology in their current practice. Malinowski, who advocated an ethnography of speech similar in spirit, if different in form, claimed a debt to the standard linguistic disciplines, yet treated them as grey dust against the fresh green of the field. For any work involving speech, however, these disciplines are indispensable (and Malinowski's efforts failed partly for lack of modern linguistics). Anthropology needs them and should foster them. What I am advocating is that anthropology recognize interests and needs of its own, and cultivate them; making use of linguistics, it should formulate its own ethnographic questions about speech and seek to answer them.[14]

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[14] Jakobson suggests the well known term "sociology of language" and insists that these concerns cannot be eliminated from linguistics. Linguistics and sociology should indeed develop this area, but so should anthropology, and for comparative perspective its contribution is essential. I am writing here chiefly to persuade that contribution. Moreover, I look for much of that contribution to come from those younger anthropologists who are reviving ethnography as a proud intellectual discipline, and for whom "ethnography," "ethnoscience," "ethnotheory" are significant and prestigeful terms. Hence the "ethnography" of my slogan. As for the "speaking," it reflects a theoretical bias that I hope shortly to be able to develop in more detail, relating it to a variety of other ideas, including some of Talcott Parsons. I am especially sorry not to say more about Firth's work here. Only when the paper was long overdue at the printer did I discover that Firth had clearly posed the general problem of factors and functions of speech more than a generation ago (1935). In large part I have only come upon a concern already there in his writings, unfortunately unread, although I differ from his conceptualization at several points. (Cf. Firth 1935, 1950, and Bursill-Hall 1960.)

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